

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00

SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 AEC-11 H-03 INR-11 L-03 OIC-04

OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20

TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07 ACDA-19 NIC-01 CU-05 AECE-00

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O R 120910Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2426

INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 13823

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, FR, GW, UK, UR, US, CSCE

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET APPROACH TO CSCE

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: A. STATE 196420 B. BONN 14164 C. MOSCOW 13321

1. SUMMARY: WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE NEW ROUND OF CSCE TALKS WITH FRENCH, BRITISH, AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES (REFTEL A). OUR GENERAL CONSENSUS IS THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO WANT A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT CONCLUSION BUT ARE PROBABLY PREPARED TO HANG TOUGH ON BASKET THREE AND THE MILITARY ISSUES FOR QUITE SOME TIME. AS TO WHETHER THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO BEND AT SOME POINT, OUR OWN SPECULATION IS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS NOT YET FACED THIS QUESTION. WE SUSPECT IT IS STILL HOPING THAT A MORE FLEXIBLE WESTERN POSITION WILL SAVE IT FROM THE DIFFICULT INTERNAL DECISIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT LOST THEIR REGARD FOR THE IMPORTANCE OF CSCE TO THEIR FOREIGN POLICY. WHILE MANY OF THEIR OBJECTIVES AT THIS POINT ARE NEGATIVE, DAMAGE-LIMITING ONES, THERE ARE STILL SOME POSITIVE SOVIET GOALS LEFT. THEY WANT A STAGE THREE SUMMIT, AS THE ONLY FITTING CONCLUSION TO A CONFERENCE WHICH HAS BEEN A MAJOR SOVIET INITIATIVE AND TO WHICH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP (AND BREZHNEV PERSONALLY) HAVE INVESTED GREAT CAPITAL. THEY WANT A TREATY-LIKE COMMITMENT TO THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS, WHICH REMAINS IMPORTANT FOR THEM IN BOTH THE GERMAN AND THE ASIAN CONTEXT. AND THEY WANT THE IMPETUS THAT A SUCCESSFUL EUROPEAN CONFERENCE COULD GIVE TO A SIMILAR SCHEME FOR ASIA.

3. WE SEE NO SIGNS, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE THE BASIC CONCESSIONS ON BASKET THREE AND THE MILITARY ISSUES WHICH COULD PUT A CONCLUDING SUMMIT IN SIGHT. THE FRENCH HAVE CONFIRMED TO US KOVALEV'S TOUGHNESS ON BOTH QUESTIONS: ON CBM'S HE ARGUED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TAKEN UNPRECEDENTED (SIC) STEPS AND NOW IT WAS UP TO THE WEST TO  
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MAKE CONCESSIONS, AND ON BASKET THREE HE PLAYED BACK THE SCRATCHY RECORD ON INTERFERENCE IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS. SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ZEMSKOV, WHO HAS ALSO HAD SOME CSCE RESPONSIBILITIES, TOLD AN FRG VISITOR MINISTER PRESIDENT OSWALD OF HESSEN SEPTEMBER 2 THAT THE FRG DELEGATION AT GENEVA WAS MAKING TROUBLE. (ZEMSKOV DWELT ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BASKET ONE PRINCIPLES, OMITTING BASKET THREE ALTOGETHER, AND URGED THE IMPORTANCE OF CSCE'S CONFIRMING THE FRG-SOVIET

TREATY ON INVIOALITY OF FRONTIERS.) AND A. P. SHITIKOV, CCHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET'S COUNCIL OF THE UNION AND THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY, COMPLAINED TO A FRENCH PARLIAMENTARY GROUP SEVERAL DAYS AGO THAT THE FRENCH DELEGATION AT GENEVA WAS NOT BEING HELPFUL. PRESS COVERAGE OF THE RE-OPENING OF THE GENEVA TALKS HAS ALSO SHOWN NO GIVE IN SOVIET POSITIONS.

4. IT WOULD BE UNTYPICAL OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING TACTICS FOR THEM TO RETURN TO GENEVA READY TO MAKE QUICK DEALS. A BETTER TIME FOR THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN LAST JULY. IF THEY COULD NOT BRING THEMSELVES TO THE REQUISITE CONCESSIONS THEN, THERE SEEMS LITTLE REASON FOR THEM TO GIVE IN NOW, SINCE THE SUMMER BREAK HAS ALREADY COST THEM THE MOMENTUM THEY WANTED AND FURTHER DELAY WILL NOT HURT THEM THAT MUCH MORE. MOREOVER, THEY MAY HOPE THAT THE CHANGED POLITICAL FACE OF WESTERN EUROPE (AND WITH A NEW BRITISH ELECTION IMMINENT) WILL STILL SOFTEN WESTERN OBDURACY.

5. THE SOVIET PRESS SEEMS, INDEED, TO BE PREPARING ITS READERS FOR A LONG PULL. THERE HAS BEEN UNUSUALLY SKIMPY COVERAGE OF CSCE -- ONLY ONE MAJOR COMMENTARY (REFTEL C) -- AND MUCH OF IT HAS BEEN EITHER PERFUNCTORY (E.G., THE PRAVDA LEADER SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE PRAVDA INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SEPTEMBER 8) OR MILDLY DOWNBEAT (E.G., AN IZVESTIYA REPORT OF SEPTEMBER 10 WHICH REFERRED TO NUMEROUS DIFFICULTIES ON THE WAY TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION). MOREOVER, NEITHER BREZHNEV NOR PODGORNYY MENTIONED CSCE IN THEIR SPEECHES LAST WEEKEND. ONE PURPOSE OF THIS ODD TREATMENT COULD BE, OF COURSE, TO PERSUADE THE WEST THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT SO DEEPLY COMMITTED TO CSCE THAT THEY WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS.

6. EVEN SUPPOSING THE SOVIETS ARE NOT READY TO MAKE CONCESSIONS  
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NOW, WHAT ABOUT LATER? OUR ANSWER HERE IS HIGHLY SPECULATIVE, BUT WE DOUBT THAT THEY HAVE FACED THIS QUESTIONS THEMSELVES. THE FAILURE TO BREAK THE LOGJAM IN JUNE AND JULY -- WHEN THE SOVIETS HAD MUCH TO GAIN FROM ACHIEVING A FINISH WITH A FLOURISH -- INDICATES THE STRENGTH OF DOMESTIC INTRANSIGENCE ON THE GUT ISSUES. ON CBM'S, THE MAJOR FACTORS INHIBITING PROGRESS WOULD SEEM TO BE THE ARGUMENT (PRESUMABLY ADVANCED MAINLY, BUT PROBABLY NOT SOLELY, BY THE MILITARY) THAT SOVIET SECURITY WOULD SUFFER, THE DESIRE NOT TO BE SUBJECTED TO RESTRICTIONS FROM WHICH THE OTHER SUPER-POWER IS EXEMPT, AND THE FEAR THAT THE WEST COULD USE CSCE DECISIONS ON CBM'S TO PRESS THE SOVIETS IN THE MBFR TALKS. ON BASKET THREE, THE FAMILIAR FEARS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND FOR THE EFFECT ON EASTERN EUROPE APPARENTLY STILL RUN VERY STRONG.

7. AT SOME POINT BREZHNEV MAY DECIDE TO KNOCK HEADS ON THESE ISSUES, BUT HE IS UNLIKELY TO DO SO WHILE THERE IS A FLICKER OF HOPE THAT THE WEST MAY BECOME MORE MALLEABLE DURING THE SECOND GENEVA ROUND. FOR THE TIME BEING, AT LEAST, THERE WOULD SEEM NO COMPELLING REASON FOR HIM TO RISK THE INSTITUTIONAL IRE OF SUCH POWERFUL PRESSURE GROUPS AS THE SECURITY APPARATUS AND THE MILITARY. A ROMANIAN HERE HAS TOLD US THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DECIDED TO STONE-WALL TOTALLY AND ARE EVEN PREPARED TO FOREGO A CONCLUDING SUMMIT. WE DOUBT THAT AT THIS POINT THEY HAVE COME TO SUCH A DRASTIC CONCLUSION. BUT WE HAVE NOT CHANGED OUR VIEW THAT SOVIET CONCESSIONS OF A SWEEPING KIND ARE UNIMAGINABLE.

8. THUS, OUR SPECULATIVE CONCLUSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE BATTENING DOWN FOR A LONG FALL, AND MAYBE EVEN A LONG WINTER, IN GENEVA. IF THIS TURNS OUT TO BE SO, WE WOULD ALSO EXPECT MINIMAL PROGRESS AT MBFR, SINCE MOSCOW WOULD PROBABLY CONTINUE TO SEEK WHAT LITTLE LEVERAGE IT COULD GET FROM CONDITIONING PROGRESS IN VIENNA TO PROGRESS IN GENEVA.

9. AS A FOOTNOTE, FRENCH DCM HUSSON HAS CONFIRMED THE INFORMATION IN REFTELS A AND B ON ANDREANI'S CONSULTATIONS HERE. WHILE THE SOVIETS RAISED THE ISSUE OF FOLLOW-UP MACHINERY, HUSSON FELT THEIR PRESENTATION WAS QUITE PERFUNCTORY (AND THEREFORE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH VIEW HELD BY SOME OBSERVERS THAT SOVIETS MAY BE CONCERNED THAT THE FOLLOW-ON MACHINERY

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COULD BE USED FOR HOLDING THEIR FEET TO THE FIRE ON BASKET THREE AND CBM'S). KOVALEV ALSO SAID THAT THE CYPRUS QUESTION HAD NO DIRECT CONNECTION WITH CSCE.  
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## Message Attributes

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